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In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition,
based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a diﬀerence to
mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric (‘‘you’’) or an allocentric (‘‘he/
she/they’’) stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By
contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental state of the other person needs to be repre-
sented as independent from the self. We suggest here that people with Asperger syndrome suﬀer from a dis-
connection between a strong naı¨ve egocentric stance and a highly abstract allocentric stance. We argue that
the currently used distinction between ﬁrst-person and third-person perspective-taking is orthogonal to the
distinction between an egocentric and an allocentric stance and therefore cannot serve as a critical test of
allocentrism.
 2005 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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Bernard was a precocious child. He invented complicated games that the other children did not
understand and he had ﬁts of rage when they refused to play. At school, Bernard was never the1053-8100/$ - see front matter  2005 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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gence but found that he was quite unable to work with others in a group. He learned in his
own way, refusing to ﬁt in with the syllabus.
When he was an adolescent he became obsessed with a particular classmate who was highly
popular. He was surprised that this boy made an oﬃcial complaint when he had copied every de-
tail of his attire. He said he just wanted to be equally popular. Bernard increasingly showed signs
of acute anxiety and was ﬁnally referred to a specialist, who diagnosed him as having Asperger
syndrome. The diagnosis was very important to him because, according to Bernard, he now
understood why he was so diﬀerent and why he had so many problems with what he referred
to as the social rules.
He avidly reads books and watches documentaries that are relevant to his areas of interest, but
he never reads novels or watches TV drama, which he claims are not worth the bother and a waste
of time. He lives with his parents but complains about having to ﬁt in with their rules. When his
mother had to go to hospital, he was angry that his daily routine was ruined. On the other hand,
when one day she had a gastric upset and could only sip weak tea, Bernard brought her a big bag
of ﬁsh and chips—to cheer her up. His mother accepts his blatant egocentrism as a part of his
condition and she takes it with a sense of humour. She laughingly related that Bernards greatest
wish is to live alone in a big house served by a large number of robots.
This vignette gives an impression of the limited, but by no means absent social competence of a
not untypical individual with Asperger syndrome. In current clinical practice Asperger syndrome
is still a controversial diagnosis, but it tends to be most often used for the milder forms of autistic
disorder combined with high verbal ability (Frith, 2004; Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004). In the
following we will use the abbreviation AS to refer to Asperger syndrome. Since research has not
succeeded in delineating clear-cut diﬀerences between the cognitive characteristics of high-func-
tioning adults with autism and those with Asperger syndrome, our AS category includes both.
For our present purposes we consider AS individuals with normal or superior intellectual abil-
ity who show the following features: diﬃculty in reciprocal social interaction, communication
impairments, a lack of ﬂexibility with obsessive tendencies, and a single-minded pursuit of narrow
interests. Here we focus exclusively on the social impairment. We believe that a deeper analysis of
this impairment is needed than has hitherto been provided by the notion of a lack of ‘‘theory of
mind,’’ also known as mindblindness or mentalizing failure (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith, 2001;
Happe´ et al., 1996).
AS individuals are often able to pass standard theory of mind tests, yet their capacity to men-
talize seems fragile. Could it be that their successful mentalizing is limited by a high degree of ego-
centrism? Indeed, Asperger (1944) described the children he identiﬁed as ‘‘egocentric in the
extreme.’’ Later on in this paper we will give speciﬁc examples to illustrate the type of egocentrism
seen in AS. First, however, we will attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and
allocentrism.2. Diﬀerent roles and diﬀerent stances
Dennett (1987) introduced the notion of the intentional stance, which can be deﬁned as a strat-
egy for understanding an entitys behaviour by treating it as if it were a rational agent. We will not
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possible kinds of stance that one can adopt towards an agent: the egocentric and the allocentric
stance. When we adopt an egocentric stance we understand the other person relative to ourselves,
which allows us to locate him in our social world and to interact with him. For example, Piaget
pointed out that young children can easily understand the relationship between themselves and
their mother but it is more diﬃcult for them to understand that their mother is also their fathers
wife. This understanding requires an allocentric stance, which represents the other independently
of ones own current relation with her. The allocentric stance allows us to generate a folk psychol-
ogy, which generally applies to all people.
We will show ﬁrst that this distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism is orthogonal
to the distinction between ﬁrst-person and third-person perspective. As this distinction has
rarely been addressed in the literature on mindreading, we will oﬀer some speculations, which
we will test on speciﬁc examples of problems in social behaviour as experienced by AS
individuals.
2.1. First-person versus third-person role-taking
Most of the literature on the topic of theory of mind has focused on the processes involved in
the interpretation of another persons behaviour. For instance, standard false belief tasks focus
solely on belief ascription to others, taking for granted that the children know their own beliefs.
The main disagreement between theory–theory and simulation–theory concerns the mechanisms
underlying the ascription of mental states to others (Nichols & Stich, 2003). Indeed, these theories
very rarely address the question of self-ascription. However, theory of mind is not restricted to the
understanding of others, but also includes self-knowledge. A full account of mindreading should
thus include a theory of both third-person and ﬁrst-person ascription.
Some studies have investigated the relationship between ﬁrst-person and third-person mind-
reading. For instance, both Gopnik (1993) and Happe´ (2003) argue that children acquire knowl-
edge of their own mental states and knowledge of the mental states of others at the same time and
show the same diﬃculties in both cases. According to Gopnik and Astington (1988), 3-year-old
children have the same diﬃculty in understanding that a belief could be false, whether it is their
own or someone elses. More generally, there seems to be a striking parallel in performance on
ﬁrst- and third-person tasks. However, these data are controversial, as most of the experiments
concern knowledge of ones own past mental states, rather than current ones (for a review, see
Nichols & Stich, 2003).
Using brain imaging, Vogeley and collaborators have systematically investigated the neural ba-
sis of ﬁrst-person and third-person spatial and mental perspectives. Subjects were asked to de-
scribe a visual scene from a ﬁrst-person visuo-spatial point of view or from the point of view
of an avatar (Vogeley et al., 2004). The results show some brain activation common to both points
of view in occipital, parietal, and prefrontal areas, but also diﬀerences between ﬁrst-person per-
spective (medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and superior temporal cortex bilat-
erally) and third-person perspective (medial superior parietal and right premotor cortex).
Similarly, Vogeley et al. (2001) show that in addition to joint neural mechanisms, diﬀerent brain
areas are activated whether subjects ascribe mental states to others (anterior cingulate cortex) or
to themselves (right temporo-parietal junction). Ruby and Decety (2003) also emphasize the
722 U. Frith, F. de Vignemont / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 719–738involvement of the inferior parietal cortex in self- versus other-awareness. These results are
consistent with the literature about the sense of agency (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Ruby & Decety,
2001).
The question raised across these studies is whether the processes involved in mentalizing vary
according to the target (self versus other) to whom you attribute mental states. They require sub-
jects to take the targets perspective on the world and as such, are often labelled ‘‘perspective-tak-
ing’’ tasks. However, we want to argue that this label is confusing, particularly if we refer to
spatial perspective-taking. We can trace this conceptual confusion in developmental psychology
to Piaget himself.
Piagets original ideas on mental development have focused on egocentrism in early childhood,
based on experimental studies such as the famous three mountains problem (Piaget & Inhelder,
1948/1956). Here a child has to indicate which view an observer would have from a diﬀerent posi-
tion than the childs own (see Fig. 1).
Using this paradigm, children up to about age 7, at the so-called pre-operational stage, were
found to lack the ability to appreciate a diﬀerent viewpoint from their own. Only when they en-
tered the concrete-operational stage, between 7 and 12, did they achieve ‘‘decentring.’’ This allows
them to take account of multiple aspects of a task to solve it. According to Piaget, then, egocen-
trism, understood as an inability to decentre and take another persons perspective, is the norm in
young children. A variant of the three mountains paradigm has been used by Hobson (1984) as a
way of assessing social role-taking in autistic children. He found that autistic children were not
more impaired in this task than other children of the same intellectual level who were not sociallyFig. 1. The three mountains problem (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948). Piaget asks the children to pick from four pictures the
view that he, Piaget, would see. Younger children would pick the picture of the view they themselves see. Older children
pick correctly.
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impairment in autism.
Piagets theory of egocentrism has not gone unchallenged (for a review, see Perner, 1991). Like-
wise, Rochat (1995) showed that children as young as 3 years old are able to discriminate what is
reachable for themselves from what is reachable for someone else. He concluded:From 3 years of age, young children are clearly capable of perspective taking, spatial decen-
tration, and are ﬂexible in adopting an egocentric or an allocentric perspective, depending on
the requirements of the task (Rochat, 1995, p. 12)Piaget and Rochat disagree about the age at which children can take someone elses point of
view, and we do not intend here to settle this debate. Rather, we would like to argue that both
of them have confounded the egocentric (versus allocentric) stance with role-taking. The three
mountains problem supposes that the subject takes someone elses visuo-spatial but still egocen-
tric perspective. The aﬀordance of reachability makes sense only for an agent, whether it is the self
or the other. When reaching for an object the location of the object has to be encoded in relation
to the agents body. Therefore, the task always relies on an egocentric representation of the object
and cannot inform us about the allocentric perspective-taking ability of young children. This ech-
oes the contention of Vogeley and Fink (2003, p. 39) that ‘‘the diﬀerence between ﬁrst- and third-
person-perspective is that 3PP necessitates a translocation of the egocentric viewpoint.’’
We do not claim here that the third-person perspective is always egocentric. Instead we claim
that the traditional distinction in the literature between ﬁrst- and third-person perspective is fo-
cused on the centre of reference (self versus other) and does not concern the perspective adopted
on this centre of reference (egocentric versus allocentric). Consequently, it does not make a dis-
tinction between second-person and third-person perspective, a dimension that we believe has
been overlooked in the mindreading literature to date.
2.2. Egocentric versus allocentric viewpoint in spatial cognition
The distinction between egocentric and allocentric representations was ﬁrst made in spatial cog-
nition. The core hypothesis is that the spatial location of an object can be encoded in two diﬀerent
ways. First, it can be encoded in its perceptual relation to the agent (e.g., the apple is in front of
me). This egocentric representation of the location is directly linked to the actions that the agent
can perform toward the object: it is only if I know where the apple is relative to my body that I can
reach it. The egocentric frame of reference is thus centred on the agent, whether the agent is me,
you, or a third person.
The allocentric representation of the object is in terms of its surroundings independently of the
agent (the apple is on the table). The object thus exists even if there is no relation with the self or
another person. Consequently, allocentric representations do not change if the agent moves. In
contrast to egocentric representations, which depend on the relationship between the object
and the agent, allocentric representations maintain some kind of invariance of the perceived item
relative to the agent. Furthermore, an allocentric representation of an object allows one to link
this object to other objects, again independently of the agent.
Egocentric representations allow visuo-motor transformations, which lead to actions, but these
representations are of little value when making a conscious perceptual judgement. Objects have to
724 U. Frith, F. de Vignemont / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 719–738be perceived in their mutual relationship in allocentric coordinates to be perceived in their own
right and to give rise to perceptual judgements according to the ‘‘constraint of contrastive iden-
tiﬁcation’’ (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). For instance, to see that the shape of the object is cylindri-
cal, one needs to be able to compare diﬀerent instantiations of this shape, that is, diﬀerent objects
that are also cylindrical.
This dual encoding has been shown at the neural level in a distinction between two kinds of
neurons in the parietal cortex (Sakata & Kusunoki, 1992). Some are dedicated to the position
of the visual stimuli presented to an immobile observer in a frame of reference centred on the ob-
ject. Others are dedicated to the stimuli in relation to the agents actions in a frame of reference
centred on the agents body (relative to eye, head, and body position in space). This distinction
between egocentric and allocentric spatial representations has been conﬁrmed by a double disso-
ciation between apperceptive agnosia and optic ataxia (for a review, see Jeannerod, 1997). For
instance, Milner and Goodales famous patient DF, who became an apperceptive visual agnosic,
can reach and grasp simple shapes but is unable to judge their spatial properties or to compare
two diﬀerent items. In other words, she cannot translate her egocentric representation of the shape
into an allocentric one. Conversely, AT, an optic ataxic patient is able to evaluate the size of an
object but not to grasp it. She cannot represent the object relative to her body in egocentric coor-
dinates. Interestingly, in everyday life, it is better to be optic ataxic than agnosic, as it is the latter
patients who are more deeply handicapped (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003).
This distinction between space perception and visuo-motor transformation illustrates a disso-
ciation between the visual systems that mediate object knowledge and object-directed action (Mil-
ner & Goodale, 1995). Can a similar dissociation be found in theory of mind between target
knowledge based on allocentrism and target-directed action based on egocentrism?
2.3. Egocentrism versus allocentrism in social cognition
We propose that we attribute mental states to an agent by adopting either an egocentric or an
allocentric stance. Here, two questions can be raised:
• About the target: to whom do I attribute mental states, to myself or to another?
• About the stance: according to which stance do I represent the target, egocentric or allocentric?
In this framework, both the ﬁrst- and the third-person perspective may be either egocentric or
allocentric.
The idea of diﬀerent stances adopted towards the same individual has been traditionally devel-
oped in philosophy of language. For instance, Ernst Mach reported that one day on the bus he
noticed a man that looked like a shabby pedagogue and then realized that he was looking at
his own reﬂection on a mirror (Perry, 1997). In this example, Mach has two attitudes toward him-
self. At the beginning, he refers to himself through a detached description (‘‘the man who looks
like a shabby pedagogue’’) and only afterwards does he refer to himself as himself. Interestingly,
the two attitudes (called de dicto and de se) cannot be reduced one to the other. Let us imagine
that someones trousers are on ﬁre. As long as I do not realize that it is my own trousers that
are on ﬁre, I cannot take appropriate action (Kaplan, 1989). Neither can de se attitudes be
reduced to de re propositions using a demonstrative (‘‘that man whose trousers are on ﬁre’’).
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proposition remains allocentric. The ﬁrst-person pronoun cannot be replaced by any other
descriptions or proper names, even if they refer to the same individual. It plays a unique cognitive
role, as it is directly connected to actions. Conversely, any description, however accurate and spe-
ciﬁc, will always leave open the possibility that the subject does not recognize himself in the
description.
We would like here to suggest that these two attitudes toward the self correspond to two kinds
of representation: egocentric and allocentric. Egocentric representations of the self derive from a
direct knowledge attached to the self, while allocentric representations of the self derive from a
detached knowledge of the person that one happens to be (Perry, 2002; de Vignemont, 2005).
In the former case, one has privileged direct self-knowledge, which one cannot have about any-
body else. In the latter case, one represents oneself as a person among others.
Similarly, we would like to suggest that the other could also be represented according to an ego-
centric or an allocentric stance. Indeed, the social world involves not only a ﬁrst-person (the self)
and a third-person (the other unrelated to the self), but also a second-person (the other related to
the self), the distinction between the latter two perspectives being neglected by the literature on
role-taking. Taking an egocentric stance means that others are represented only because they
are related to the self in one way or another. Conversely, taking an allocentric stance means that
the existence and/or mental states of others are completely independent from the self.
An egocentric stance represents the relationship between an individual (be it an object or a per-
son) and the self. In the case of spatial cognition, the nature of this relation seems quite clear. An
object either can be in extra-personal space located in allocentric coordinates, or in peri-personal
space (for object-directed actions) located in egocentric coordinates. However, it seems less clear
in social cognition. The boundaries between extra-personal and peri-personal social space are
blurred. Intuitively, we would like to claim that the egocentric stance is based on direct social rela-
tionship. The complexity of the social network is such that it is diﬃcult to specify more precisely
what we mean. A range of diﬀerent situations may arise:
• The subject actively participates in a self-centred situation (like his own birthday party).
• The subject actively participates in a self-related situation as one among others (like a football
game).
• The subject witnesses an external self-related situation (like people talking about him).
• The subject witnesses an external self-unrelated situation (like a football game on TV).
In all these situations, the subject is in a direct physical and perceptual relationship with others.
However, the relation is less and less strong. We propose that we adopt an egocentric stance when
we ascribe mental states (1) that are explicitly related to us or (2) that are relevant for us and
implicitly related to us. This notion of relevance may vary and we would like here to suggest that
people with AS stretch this notion of relevance more than normal adults, applying it when it does
not seem to be appropriate.
One intriguing consequence is that someone ceases to exist according to an egocentric stance
when this person goes outside the social realm of the self. For instance, children have trouble
understanding that their mother has a life of her own, outside of her relation to them. If we were
unable to adopt an allocentric stance, then our understanding of the social world would be very
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tance of being able to ascribe mental states to diﬀerent persons in order to grasp their meaning.
According to Evanss Generality Constraint, I can properly think that I am angry only if I am able
to think that Kathy is angry or Harry is angry. We suggest that this is true not only for simple
mental states with one argument (the subject), but also for states and behaviours with two argu-
ments (the subject and another agent). Consequently, one could suggest that a proper grip on folk
psychology requires understanding that relations are not only between oneself and someone else,
but also between two external persons unrelated to oneself. I can think that I am jealous of Kathy
only if I am able to report that Harry is jealous of Kathy or that Peter is jealous of Susan. It is
only by taking an allocentric perspective that one can fully understand social relationships. There-
fore, purely egocentric mentalizing would lead someone to a defective folk psychology.
This does not mean that egocentric mentalizing has no purpose. The reverse question can also
be asked: what would happen if we had only an allocentric representation of others and ourselves?
If you do not understand how you are related to the others, if you do not know your social loca-
tion relative to them in an immediate way, you may suﬀer from poor social interactions. You may
lack an ‘‘immediate, pre-reﬂective, or implicit understanding of the meaning of social interaction’’
(Zahavi & Parnas, 2003). You may try to compensate for your lack of egocentric representations
of others by using your allocentric social knowledge. Yet, this knowledge will not have been ac-
quired on the basis of normal social experience and may result in a set of abstract rules. The allo-
centric stance is detached from interactions with people, while the egocentric stance is immersed in
social interactions and directly connected to them. As we noticed earlier, it is only if we are able to
connect something or someone to ourselves that we can act properly.
There seems therefore to be a mutual dependency between egocentric and allocentric stances.
The allocentric social knowledge is partly based on memories of past egocentric interactions
and inferences drawn upon them. The egocentric stance is inﬂuenced by a wider allocentric knowl-
edge of people. A rich social life is thus based on egocentric mentalizing, balanced by allocentric
mentalizing, which provides an accuracy check on the mental states of other people (see Table 1).
Based on this distinction, we can suggest a triangle model as in Fig. 2A such that the other can
be understood either according to an egocentric stance (‘‘you’’) or to an allocentric stance (‘‘he/
she/they’’). We suggest that people suﬀering from Asperger syndrome are likely to represent oth-
ers predominantly in relationship to themselves, as per the ‘‘star shape’’ model centred on the self
in Fig. 2B, while mutual relations between others are not represented. A consequence of this self-
centred model might be that only the people related to the Asperger individual will be truly
considered as persons with mental states, while the others would be considered ‘‘as furniture’’
(Gerland, 1997, p. 64). In naı¨ve egocentrism, the self is the only point of reference.Table 1
Main features of egocentric and allocentric stance
Egocentric stance Allocentric stance
Communication device Second-person Third-person
Epistemic basis Direct relationship with the other Any kind of relationship
Attitude Immersed Detached
Subject-dependency Subjective Objective
Function Social interaction Folk psychology
Fig. 2. The social world involves a ﬁrst-person (the self), a second-person (the other related to the self) and a third-
person component (the other unrelated to the self). (A) Triangle model: one can mentalize from an egocentric point of
view when the other is related to the self and from an allocentric point of view when the other is not related to the self,
but to other people. (B) Star model: the allocentric stance is impaired and the social world is self-centred. People do not
exist by themselves, but only relative to their relationship with the subject.
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We have discussed the distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in some detail because
we believe that the distinction is useful when we try to understand the limitations of mentalizing in
Asperger syndrome. What are these limitations? In this next part we will review the evidence for
both failures and successes on mentalizing tasks. After this, we will illustrate social diﬃculties with
real life examples provided largely by AS individuals themselves. We will try to show that it would
be a mistake to consider these anecdotes as deriving from a particular personality feature. Instead,
they can be systematically understood as the consequences of an imbalance between egocentric
and allocentric stances. We will attempt to reﬁne these ideas with regard to mentalizing in the ﬁnal
section of this paper.
3.1. Limitations on mentalizing in Asperger syndrome
While the ﬁrst empirical tests of the mindblindness hypothesis were carried out with relatively
young and/or low-functioning children (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), it soon became clear
that success on these tasks was achieved by autistic children who reached a verbal mental age of
about 10 or above (Happe´, 1995). Thus, the current assumption is that more able children with
autism spectrum disorder gradually acquire an understanding of mental states, albeit with a delay
of about 5 years (in terms of verbal mental age) compared to normally developing children. This
huge delay suggests that late-acquired theory of mind is not the same as early-appearing intuitive
mentalizing ability.
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severe in children with Asperger syndrome than in children with autism (Ziatas, Durkin, &
Pratt, 1998, 2003), and in some cases of AS adults none or very little impairment may be found
(e.g., Bowler, 1992; Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996; Ozonoﬀ, Rogers, & Pennington, 1991).
Impairments have been documented, however, in a number of studies with more complex the-
ory of mind tests. These include stories requiring attribution of speakers intentions (Happe´,
1994; Jolliﬀe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Kaland et al., 2002), tests of judging mental state from
the eyes or from the voice (Baron-Cohen, Jolliﬀe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Kleinman,
Marciano, & Ault, 2001; Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002), understanding
faux-pas (Baron-Cohen, ORiordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999) and video-clips of situations
that are close to real life encounters (Channon, 2004; Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter,
2000). A mild degree of mentalizing impairment is compatible with either compensatory learn-
ing or a milder initial deﬁcit. A continuing impairment is evident in very able AS adults when
implicit (on-line) theory of mind tasks are used, such as attribution of mental states to moving
geometric shapes (Abell, Happe´, & Frith, 2000; Castelli, Frith, Happe´, & Frith, 2002; Klin,
2000).
Performance on standard false belief tasks has been shown to be subject to improvement with
training (Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin, & Hill, 1997; Kloo & Perner, 2003; Ozonoﬀ & Miller,
1995; Wellman et al., 2002). It is therefore possible that the relatively good performance of able
and older individuals with Asperger syndrome on these tasks is due to extended practice. This
practice might make use of certain heuristics (e.g., when an event occurs and a person is not
present, the event is ignored or cancelled), which in turn might involve verbal or pictorial strate-
gies to facilitate the understanding of the contents of other minds, as suggested for instance by
Hurlburt, Happe´, and Frith (1994). Thus, people with autistic disorder may use their ability to
visualize and reﬂect on images and words to gain an understanding of the representational nature
of beliefs.
One observation that is diﬃcult to reconcile with the idea of a mentalizing impairment is the
heightened sense of self that individuals with Asperger syndrome exhibit. Asperger himself
acknowledged this fact:These children observe themselves constantly. They are an object of interest to themselves,
and they direct their attention towards the functions of their body. (Frith, 1991 translation,
p.73)Furthermore, there are an ever-increasing number of autobiographical accounts, which attest
to intense desire and high ability to introspect. Biographical accounts as well as countless anec-
dotal examples show that people with Asperger syndrome do reﬂect on their own feelings and
thoughts.
There is experimental evidence, too. People with Asperger syndrome asked to reﬂect on their
inner states are capable of doing so, in line with their ability to reason about mental states in false
belief tasks. This was demonstrated by Hurlburt et al. (1994). Yet during this experiment it was
observed that the AS individuals had no interest whatever in comparing their own self-reports
with those of others, contrary to normal adults. Likewise, a lack of interest in gossip or ﬁctional
literature and movies suggests there is little interest in analyzing the feelings of other people unless
they relate to the self.
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haps only a delay, is present in AS. Does it make sense to talk of a mild degree of mentalizing
impairment? Why does mentalizing appear to be successfully mastered in some but not all
situations?
It is possible that AS individuals are limited in their ability to attribute mental states to others
because they are often locked into an egocentric perspective. Extreme egocentrism (or egocentric-
ity) has been highlighted by Gillberg and Gillberg (1989) in their diagnostic criteria for AS as the
way of characterizing social impairment:
Social impairment with extreme egocentricity, which may include:
• Inability to interact with peers.
• Lack of desire to interact with peers.
• Poor appreciation of social cues.
• Socially and emotionally inappropriate responses.
We would like here to give concrete examples that illustrate and reﬁne this schematic list.
Importantly egocentrism here is not to be confused with ordinary selﬁshness, egotism, or calcu-
lated lack of consideration for others. Below we provide some preliminary and anecdotal evidence
for our proposal with annotated examples. These are taken from autobiographical writings by
authors with AS (Gerland, 1997; Lawson, 1998; Sainsbury, 2000; Willey, 1999).
3.2. A Self-centred World
Can the social world of AS individuals be depicted with the ‘‘star shape’’ model centred on the
self? Indeed, most of the time they prefer to be on their own. For instance, Willey (1999, p. 35)
says: ‘‘My own conversations and thoughts were always my best friends. I was happy spending
time with only me, happy to talk to myself and happy to entertain myself.’’ When they are not
alone, their relationships to others remain still self-centred.
Own point of view is paramount
AS individuals are very interested in themselves, but they do not seem to feel the need to com-
pare themselves with others. They like to talk and write about themselves, as they see themselves.
Other peoples ideas and opinions are not as interesting as their own. Willey (1999, p. 28) reports:
‘‘It was easy for me to give my opinions on things, virtually all the time. I was by far the most
blunt and outspoken of our group, even when my friends suggested I had gone too far, I never
knew how far was too far. Even now, I cannot ﬁnd one reliable reason for keeping my thoughts
to myself.’’
Most of the time, AS individuals seem to believe that everybody should be interested in what
they think. However, if they ﬁnd out that other people are not so interested in them, then they can
feel very despondent. Willey (1999) talks about being invisible when she started college (pp. 43–
44): ‘‘Soon, I found my steps were never followed and my phone was never called. Soon, I saw I
was invisible. On one level this did not bother me. I liked my time alone and my personal space.
But day in day out, rejection began to lay heavy on my shoulders most likely because I did not
understand why I was excluded.’’
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Often AS individuals suppose that everybody has the same desires and beliefs as themselves,
and they cannot understand the diﬀerences. Lawson (1998/2000, p. 57) says: ‘‘I thought everyone
saw the world in the way I did, and it was very confusing for me when my delights and ecstasies
were not seen or understood by other people.’’ If they discover that people disagree with them,
then they feel frustrated. In some cases the frustration felt at not getting ones own needs under-
stood can evoke feelings of paranoia.
The contented tyrant
Just as young babies are sometimes described as tyrants, individuals with AS can be so de-
scribed by their families. They tend to make other people do what they wish and often manipulate
them successfully. They are happy if others do exactly what they want, and extremely frustrated if
they do not. Charlotte Moore (2004) in her account of autism in her family says: ‘‘The Asperger
child cannot accommodate a friend, unless the friend is prepared to obey his every command.
Other people are all right, says John Peters, a grandfather with AS speaking on the BBC docu-
mentary The Autism Puzzle, as long as they do exactly what you want.’’ (p. 69).
According to the egocentric stance the world is simple: do everything the ego wants and never
thwart it. However, the tendency to tyranny can be overcome as shown byWilley (1999): ‘‘I caution
myself never to overburden [my husband] withmy needs, to never fall in on him, to lean on him only
when I am faced with those things that toss me in circles and make me take unusual turns.’’ (p. 71).
Diﬃculties in avoiding egocentric relevance
Ambiguous messages are known to be problematic for people with AS while other people often
do not even notice ambiguity. It is possible that in some cases the ambiguity arises from interpret-
ing the message as relevant to the self. RB, a highly intelligent and articulate woman with autism
who often speaks at conferences, reported the following experience in one of her talks, which
related to a well-known example of a pragmatic misunderstanding. RB was at her parents house
when the vicar phoned. She answered the phone, and when he asked if her mother was there, she
answered truthfully ‘‘yes’’ and put the phone down. Her reasoning was as follows: The vicar is
concerned about the well-being of the community; he is concerned about me; he wants to make
sure that I am not alone in the house. The most likely interpretation of ambiguous messages is
thus the one that refers to the self. Consequently, people with AS may interpret self-unrelated sit-
uations as being self-related.
3.3. Relating to others
Relationships to other people often seem to follow an all-or-none pattern. There are well-doc-
umented problems of working with others in groups and of ﬁtting into groups, but there is also
evidence that relationships to others are possible.
Diﬃculties in understanding that others live their own lives
From an egocentric stance other people are understood only relative to the self. AS people often
think that they are the centre of other peoples life and the only motivation for their actions and
their discourse. Consequently, they cannot understand why people do not want to be friends with
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behaviour seemed to make people angry or cause them to distance themselves from me. I came to
believe this was the case because I could never keep friends with anyone for very long. . . I never
understood why they did not want to be with me.’’ Other people do not seem to have a life by
themselves; they exist only relative to the AS individual. For instance, Lawson (1998/2000, p.
15) complains: ‘‘Other people seemed to be there just to interrupt and disturb me, or demand from
me. I responded with withdrawal or anger.’’
Diﬃculties in working in a group
A hallmark of Asperger syndrome is the diﬃculty they experience with group activities. Asperger
(1944) said of his famous case Fritz V.: ‘‘From the moment he set foot on the ward he stood out
from the rest of the group and this did not change. He remains an outsider. . . It was impossible to
get him to join in group play’’ (p. 42, Frith translation 1991). It has often been observed that even
very articulate AS individuals are much more capable in handling one on one interactions than
interactions in small groups. An anonymous student (Sainsbury, 2000, p. 50) says: ‘‘I usually dont
know how to participate in group work and am blamed for not participating.’’ More generally,
they have diﬃculties in ﬁtting in a social group when true collaboration is needed, where an
allocentric stance is clearly useful. Similarly, they do not really understand the notion of close
relationships: ‘‘I didnt know how to have a relationship. I didnt know what the point was or what
it was you were supposed to do with the man you were together with. . . I didnt grasp at all what it
meant just to be with each other, what other couples seemed to do.’’ (Gerland, 1997, p. 185).
Evidence of relationships with others
Even though it is rare for AS individuals to ﬁnd lasting friendship and marriage, and to have
children of their own, such cases have been documented, and their success needs to be explained.
Willey (1999) movingly talks about her feelings about her husband and children with lucid insight:
‘‘I worry a lot about the inﬂuence I have on my daughters self-esteem and their happiness. . . .I
can be extremely invasive and obsessive and blunt and loud. I routinely assault my childrens quiet
and their reﬂections.’’ (p. 81). We suggest that AS individuals perform best in attributing mental
states to themselves and to another if that persons mental states refer to themselves. People who
are related to the self and care about the self, such as mother, sibling, partner, have in this sense a
privileged status.
Conversely, AS individuals do not like to meet new people and ﬁnd it hard to relate to strang-
ers. Gerland (1997) reports the ﬁrst time she had been to playschool: ‘‘Everyone I didnt know had
an empty face, which meant everyone except my family. I didnt realize that these faces were peo-
ple in the same way as those I knew were people. Those faces were as lacking in content as fur-
niture’’ (p. 64). They may use their preserved mentalizing abilities for their relatives, but not for
strangers. Once they have formed a close relationship it is clear that they try hard to maintain it
and can succeed when they have the full cooperation of the other person.
3.4. Taking an abstract stance to social relationships
Having given a number of examples that are interpretable in terms of extreme egocentrism, we
now wish to draw attention to the fact that AS individuals are also capable of taking an extreme
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poignant paragraph: ‘‘One of the best ways of understanding what autism is like is to imagine
yourself as a perpetual onlooker. Much of the time life is like a video, a moving ﬁlm I can observe
but cannot reach. The world passes in front of me shielded by glass.’’
AS people are famed for being able to adopt an unbiased and highly abstract stance towards
the social world, like ‘‘an anthropologist on Mars’’ (Sacks, 1995). They thrive on the idea of rules.
This is shown whenever AS individuals talk about generalities of how people with AS behave, and
about rules that other people might follow in their social interactions that they feel they have
worked out by logical analysis. For instance, they have written eloquently about misunderstand-
ings and miscarriages of justice in general and they can be successful advocates of the plight of AS
people (Sainsbury, 2000; Willey, 1999). They have high-level social knowledge and are able to see
social structures and relationships in a detached way that can give rise to the impression that they
are cold and distanced. However, their personal logic of how the social world should work may be
very formal and far from reality.
For example, on the web one can ﬁnd ‘‘A survival guide for people with Asperger syndrome,’’
which includes a large number of social rules. The author, Marc Segar, writes in the introduction
to his guide: ‘‘I wish to lay out a set of rules and guide-lines, in a style similar to that of the high-
way code. . .You might think that these are the rules to a rather silly game, but the game is life and
the rules cannot be changed.’’ One example of such rules applies to how to ﬁnd out who your
friends are and how to behave with them. There is nothing spontaneous in these rules. For in-
stance, he says: ‘‘Try to show that you like them [your friends] using the rules given under eye
contact.’’
Similarly, RL told us that he did not understand why he should not tell his boss when his col-
leagues were not working hard enough, nor did he understand why his colleagues did not like him
because of that. For him, doing your best is what you are supposed to do and everybody should
follow this rule. Job after job, he repeated the same mistake, never learning that the social rule can
sometimes override the general rule.
The behaviour pattern of AS individuals does not ﬁt any traditional theory of mindreading. On
the contrary, it reveals the oversimpliﬁed way in which we conceptualize social cognition. We have
therefore tried to provide a new theoretical framework that enables us to account for—or at least
to analyze in more detail—naı¨ve egocentrism in AS. We claim that Asperger people are most suc-
cessful at mentalizing when they display naı¨ve egocentrism. We hypothesize that while mentaliz-
ing, people with AS are unable to connect an egocentric to an allocentric stance and can only
adopt extreme forms of either.4. An imbalance between naı¨ve egocentrism and abstract allocentrism
The main presenting feature in everyday social interactions, as illustrated in our examples,
is what we have termed naı¨ve egocentrism. This is akin to the normal egocentrism of small
children, which they normally grow out of, and which parents ﬁnd charming in babies but
not in older children or adults. Why might people with AS be stuck in this developmentally
immature stance? We propose three types of causes, but we do not exclude other possibilities
(see Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. In normal adults, the egocentric and allocentric stances interact with each other, allocentric knowledge of others
being based on egocentric interactions and conversely, allocentric knowledge of others inﬂuencing our egocentric
interactions. In AS there could be a breakdown of this mutual dependency, caused by several possible cognitive deﬁcits.
This disconnection leads to a polarization of egocentric and allocentric stances.
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One hurdle for the ability to move on from egocentrism may be informational complexity. An
allocentric stance requires mastering more information than the egocentric stance and adds a fur-
ther dimension (see Fig. 2). In the case of egocentrism, assuming privileged ﬁrst-person access,
when children interact with someone else they already understand half of the relationship, that
is, what they themselves feel and believe. All they have to do is to interpret the behaviour of
the other, and they tend to interact only with people with whom they are familiar, and with only
one person at a time.
By contrast, allocentrism requires them to understand the social interaction between two or
more external people. Therefore, they need to process more information about diﬀerent indi-
viduals at the same time. It seems that normal children in pre-school years are able to achieve
this developmental step, regardless of general ability (Hay, Payne, & Chadwick, 2004), even if
mentalizing seems to be at its best in a one-to-one situation and more diﬃcult when a number
of diﬀerent protagonists have to be monitored in a group interaction. Why not children with
autism or Asperger syndrome? It is well established that children with autistic spectrum dis-
order have diﬃculties integrating overall contextual information, while at the same time they
excel at processing information piecemeal (Frith, 2003; Happe´, 1999). It would be possible
therefore to explain naı¨ve egocentrism as a consequence of so-called weak central coherence.
A prediction from this hypothesis is that there should be a relationship between performance
on central coherence tests and performance on a test designed to assess the extent of
egocentrism.
Hypothesis 2. Switching between stances and executive function failure.
A second possible reason relates to the diﬃculty in high-level executive function that has been
found to be associated with autism spectrum disorder at all levels of ability (see review by Hill,
2004). Taking an allocentric stance when appropriate requires a high-level mechanism that con-
trols the switching between the two stances, a control mechanism that might be impaired or ab-
sent in AS (see Frith, 2003 for speculations on the consequences of a missing homunculus).
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perseveration in an egocentric stance that may be primary in development. This explanation
embraces the possibility that AS individuals do not actually lack the ability to adopt an allocentric
stance, but merely ﬁnd the switch from egocentric to allocentric stance very eﬀortful. The predic-
tion would be that once they have adopted an allocentric stance, they would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to
switch back again.
This sort of mechanism could also explain the apparent disconnection between naı¨ve egocen-
trism and abstract allocentrism that we tentatively propose. In AS, allocentrism is a priori, ruled
by logic, rather than a posteriori, based on the laws drawn from past experiences. AS individuals
manipulate mental states as if they were numbers to add and subtract, resulting in unrealistic and
sometimes highly idealized systems for understanding social relations. In contrast, the normal
allocentric stance is tempered by constant reference to egocentric viewpoints and tends therefore
to strive towards more realistic social schemes.
Even if egocentrism and allocentrism are distinct stances, they still interact most of the time.
Indeed, we can entertain both perspectives on someone and modify our egocentric judgment by
taking a more allocentric view. For example, a child may have experienced her mother as being
rather stingy in giving gifts to her, but once she discovers that the mother is involved in a charity
organization that distributes aid to disadvantaged people, she would adjust her evaluation of her
apparent lack of generosity. We do not know whether this possibility is equally open to AS peo-
ple. We would predict that there would be a relationship between switching stances and perfor-
mance on other executive switching tasks, such as have been developed by Burgess (2000).
Hypothesis 3. Confusing subjective and objective stances and metarepresentational failure.
It is possible that naı¨ve egocentrism and subtle mentalizing failure are more intimately connect-
ed. Being developmentally stuck in an egocentric stance may not be due to other cognitive prob-
lems, but due to limitations in the capacity to mentalize itself. Thus it could be due to a failure in
the metarepresentational mechanism that is postulated to underlie mentalizing (Leslie, 1987).
Thus, when we normally attribute mental states to someone else while taking an egocentric stance,
we are implicitly aware that our representation is egocentric. Similarly, when we locate an object
relative to our body, we know implicitly that this location is accurate only within an egocentric
frame of reference. Possibly, AS people do not represent their perspective as being egocentric,
but rather as being objective and self-independent. If they do not realize that their perspective
is subjective then they confound egocentrism and allocentrism. Consequently, they do not under-
stand that other peoples mental states are diﬀerent from their own. This hypothesis predicts that
the more severe the mentalizing impairment, the more severe the egocentrism and the less likely
the adoption of an allocentric stance.
We freely admit that we cannot exhaustively account for even a fraction of the social behaviour
associated with Asperger syndrome. We have tried here to provide a more ﬁne-grained analysis of
some aspects of their awareness of self and others, but a lot remains to be done both from an
experimental and a theoretical point of view. An interesting study in this area was carried out
by Langdon and Coltheart (2001), who have adopted a related distinction regarding visuo-spatial
perspective-taking in schizotypy and schizophrenia. They propose that schizotypy is associated
with a lack of allocentric perspective. Indeed, delusions of reference are nothing other than inter-
preting in a self-related way something self-unrelated. Similarly, aggressive children show an
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bute hostile intentions to a character acting towards themselves (in vignettes) but not towards
third parties (Dodge & Frame, 1982). Further experimental studies are now needed to investigate
this question by contrasting egocentric and allocentric stances in both spatial and social domains
and for other pathologies.5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have been trying to reconcile the subtle mentalizing impairments in Asperger
syndrome, their highly abstract social understanding and their limitations in on-line social inter-
actions. We took the view that the distinction between ﬁrst-person and third-person perspective
does not capture the diﬃculties in mentalizing, and that the distinction between egocentric and
allocentric stances is more critical. To support this claim we have provided a number of illustra-
tive examples of an egocentric stance in self-reports. These show that a naı¨ve egocentrism is a
common source of diﬃculty in social interchanges as experienced by individuals with AS. We also
suggest that individuals with AS are sometimes able to take a stance that suggests an extremely
abstract kind of allocentrism. Without ruling out other explanations, we propose three hypothe-
ses, each linked to cognitive problems already identiﬁed in autistic disorders (for a review see
Frith, 2003). Thus we predict that a lack of allocentric stance could relate to weak central coher-
ence, a lack of switching could relate to executive function problems, and a confusion between
subjective and objective stances could relate to metarepresentational failure.
We would like to argue that, regardless of the particular hypothesis preferred, the mentalizing
limitations in AS can be better understood in terms of a disconnection between egocentrism and
allocentrism. Normally we constantly switch between egocentric and allocentric stances, and we
know the diﬀerence. Allocentrism and egocentrism are complementary. In order to go somewhere,
you need both a map made by people who have actually moved around the city and you need to
know your own location on the map. It seems to us that people with AS either look at a map of a
city that does not exist or see small signs saying ‘‘You are here’’ everywhere. It is only when we are
able to adopt an allocentric stance that we can truly know what it is to be egocentric, and it is only
when we are able to adopt an egocentric stance that we can achieve an allocentric understanding
of others.Acknowledgments
This work was supported by MRC programme Grant G9617036 to U.F. and a Marie Curie
Fellowship to F.V.References
Abell, F., Happe´, F., & Frith, U. (2000). Do triangles play tricks? Attribution of mental states to animated shapes in
normal and abnormal development. Journal of Cognitive Development, 15, 1–20.
736 U. Frith, F. de Vignemont / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 719–738Asperger, H. (1944). Die autistischen Psychopathen im Kindesalter, Archiv fu¨r Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten (Vol.
117, pp. 76–136). Translated by U. Frith (Ed.). In Autism and Asperger Syndrome (pp. 37–92). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness. An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a ‘‘theory of mind?. Cognition, 21, 37–46.
Baron-Cohen, S., Jolliﬀe, T., Mortimore, C., & Robertson, M. (1997). Another advanced test of theory of mind:
Evidence from very high functioning adults with autism or Asperger syndrome. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry, 38(7), 813–822.
Baron-Cohen, S., ORiordan, M., Stone, V., Jones, R., & Plaisted, K. (1999). Recognition of faux pas by normally
developing children and children with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal of Autism and
Developmental Disorders, 29(5), 407–418.
Bowler, D. M. (1992). ‘‘Theory of mind’’ in Aspergers syndrome. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 33(5),
877–893.
Burgess, P. W. (2000). Strategy application disorder: The role of the frontal lobes in human multitasking. Psychological
Research, 63(3–4), 279–288.
Castelli, F., Frith, C. D., Happe´, F., & Frith, U. (2002). Autism, Asperger syndrome and brain mechanisms for the
attribution of mental states to animated shapes. Brain, 125, 1839–1849.
Channon, S. (2004). Frontal lobe dysfunction and everyday problem-solving: Social and non-social contributions. Acta
Psychologica, 115(2-3), 235–254.
Dahlgren, S. O., & Trillingsgaard, A. (1996). Theory of mind in non-retarded children with autism and Aspergers
syndrome. A research note. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 37(6), 759–763.
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dodge, K. A., & Frame, C. L. (1982). Social cognitive biases and deﬁcits in aggressive boys. Child Development, 53(3),
620–635.
Evans, G. (1982). In: J. MacDowell (Ed.), The varieties of reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Farrer, C., & Frith, C. D. (2002). Experiencing oneself vs. another person as being the cause of an action: The neural
correlates of the experience of agency. Neuroimage, 15, 596–603.
Frith, U. (2001). Mind blindness and the brain in Autism. Neuron, 32, 969–979.
Frith, U. (2003). Autism: Explaining the enigma (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Frith, U. (2004). Emmanuel Miller lecture: Confusions and controversies about Asperger syndrome. Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 45, 672–686.
Gerland, G. (1997). A real person. Life from the outside. Translated from the Swedish. London: Souvenir Press.
Gillberg, I. C., & Gillberg, C. (1989). Asperger syndrome—some epidemiological considerations: A research note.
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 30, 631–638.
Gopnik, A. (1993). How we know our minds: The illusion of ﬁrst-person knowledge of intentionality. The Behavioral
and Brain sciences, 16, 1–14.
Gopnik, A., & Astington, J. (1988). Childrens understanding of representational change and its relation to the
understanding of false belief and the appearance–reality distinction. Child Development, 59, 26–37.
Hadwin, J., Baron-Cohen, S., Howlin, P., & Hill, K. (1997). Does teaching theory of mind have an eﬀect on the ability
to develop conversation in children with autism?. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 27(5), 519–537.
Happe´, F. (1994). An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of story characters thoughts and feelings by able
autistic, mentally handicapped, and normal children and adults. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders,
24(2), 129–154.
Happe´, F. (1995). The role of age and verbal ability in the theory of mind task performance of subjects with autism.
Child Development, 66(3), 843–855.
Happe´, F. (1999). Autism: Cognitive deﬁcit or cognitive style?. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3(6), 216–222.
Happe´, F. (2003). Theory of mind and the self. Annals of the New York Academy Sciences, 1001, 134–144.
Happe´, F., Ehlers, S., Fletcher, P., Frith, U., Johansson, M., Gillberg, C., et al. (1996). Theory of mind in the brain.
Evidence from a PET scan study of Asperger syndrome. Neuroreport, 20, 197–201.
Hay, D. F., Payne, A., & Chadwick, A. (2004). Peer relations in childhood. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry,
45(1), 84–108.
U. Frith, F. de Vignemont / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 719–738 737Hill, E. L. (2004). Executive dysfunction in autism. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 26–32.
Heavey, L., Phillips, W., Baron-Cohen, S., & Rutter, M. (2000). The Awkward Moments Test: A naturalistic measure
of social understanding in autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 30(3), 225–236.
Hobson, R. P. (1984). Early childhood autism and the question of egocentrism. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 14(1), 85–104.
Hurlburt, R., Happe´, F., & Frith, U. (1994). Sampling the form of inner experience in three adults with Asperger
syndrome. Psychological Medicine, 24, 385–395.
Jacob, P., & Jeannerod, M. (2003). Ways of seeing. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jeannerod, M. (1997). The cognitive neuroscience of action. Oxford: Blackwell.
Jolliﬀe, T., & Baron-Cohen, S. (1999). The Strange Stories Test: A replication with high-functioning adults with autism
or Asperger syndrome. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29(5), 395–406.
Kaland, N., Moller-Nielsen, A., Callesen, K., Mortensen, E. L., Gottlieb, D., & Smith, L. (2002). A new advanced test
of theory of mind: Evidence from children and adolescents with Asperger syndrome. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry, 43(4), 517–528.
Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, J. Perry, & H. Wettstein (Eds.), Themes for Kaplan. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Kleinman, J., Marciano, P. L., & Ault, R. L. (2001). Advanced theory of mind in high-functioning adults with autism.
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31(1), 29–36.
Klin, A. (2000). Attributing social meaning to ambiguous visual stimuli in higher-functioning autism and Asperger
syndrome: The Social Attribution Task. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 41(7), 831–846.
Kloo, D., & Perner, J. (2003). Training transfer between card sorting and false belief understanding: Helping children
apply conﬂicting descriptions. Child Development, 74(6), 1823–1839.
Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2001). Visual perspective-taking and schizotypy: Evidence for a simulation-based
account of mentalizing in normal adults. Cognition, 82(1), 1–26.
Lawson, W. (1998/2000). Life behind Glass. A personal account of autism spectrum disorder. London: Jessica Kingsley
Publishers.
Leslie, A. (1987). Pretense and representation: The origins of Theory of Mind. Psychological Review, 94, 412–426.
Macintosh, K. E., & Dissanayake, C. (2004). Annotation: The similarities and diﬀerences between autistic disorder and
Aspergers disorder: A review of the empirical evidence. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45(3), 421–434.
Milner, D., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). The visual brain in action. New York: Oxford University Press.
Moore, C. (2004). George and Sam. London: Penguin Books.
Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2003). Mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ozonoﬀ, S., Rogers, S. J., & Pennington, B. F. (1991). Aspergers syndrome: Evidence of an empirical distinction from
high-functioning autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32(7), 1107–1122.
Ozonoﬀ, S., & Miller, J. N. (1995). Teaching theory of mind: A new approach to social skills training for individuals
with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 25(4), 415–433.
Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Perry, J. (1997). Myself and I. In M. Stamm (Ed.), Philosophie in Synthetischer Absicht (pp. 83–103). Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta.
Perry, J. (2002). Identity, personal identity and the self. Cambridge/Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1948/1956). The childs conception of space. London: Routledge and Paul Kegan.
Rutherford, M. D., Baron-Cohen, S., & Wheelwright, S. (2002). Reading the mind in the voice: A study with normal
adults and adults with Asperger syndrome and high functioning autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 32(3), 189–194.
Rochat, P. (1995). Perceived reachability for self and for others by 3- to 5-year-old children and adults. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology, 59(2), 317–333.
Ruby, P., & Decety, J. (2001). Eﬀect of subjective perspective taking during simulation of action: A PET investigation
of agency. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 546–550.
Ruby, P., & Decety, J. (2003). What do you believe versus what do you think they believe. A neuroimaging study of
perspective-taking at the conceptual level. European Journal of Neuroscience, 17, 2475–2480.
Sacks, O. (1995). An anthropologist on Mars. NY/London: Alfred Knopf/Picador.
738 U. Frith, F. de Vignemont / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 719–738Sainsbury, C. (2000). Martian in the playground: Understanding the school child with Asperger syndrome. Bristol: Lucky
Duck Publishing.
Sakata, H., & Kusunoki, M. (1992). Organization of space perception: Neural representation of three-dimensional
space in the posterior parietal cortex. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 2(2), 170–174.
Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals. London: Lowe & Brydone.
de Vignemont, F. (2005). Une question de perspective: e´gocentrisme et allocentrisme social. Confrontations
psychiatriques (in press).
Vogeley, K., Bussfeld, P., Newen, A., Herrmann, S., Happe, F., Falkai, P., et al. (2001). Mind reading: Neural
mechanisms of theory of mind and self-perspective. Neuroimage, 14(1), 170–181.
Vogeley, K., & Fink, G. R. (2003). Neural correlates of the ﬁrst-person-perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(1),
38–42.
Vogeley, K., May, M., Ritzl, A., Falkai, P., Zilles, K., & Fink, G. R. (2004). Neural correlates of ﬁrst-person
perspective as one constituent of human self-consciousness. Journal of Cognitive Neurosciences, 16(5), 817–827.
Wellman, H. M., Baron-Cohen, S., Caswell, R., Gomez, J. C., Swettenham, J., Toye, E., et al. (2002). Thought-bubbles
help children with autism acquire an alternative to a theory of mind. Autism, 6(4), 343–363.
Willey, L. H. (1999). Pretending to be normal. Living with Aspergers syndrome. London: Jessica Kingsley.
Zahavi, D., & Parnas, J. (2003). Conceptual Problems in Infantile Autism Research. Journal of Consciousness Studies,
10(9–10), 53–71.
Ziatas, K., Durkin, K., & Pratt, C. (1998). Belief term development in children with autism, Asperger syndrome, speciﬁc
language impairment, and normal development: Links to theory of mind development. Journal of Child Psychology
and Psychiatry, 39(5), 755–763.
Ziatas, K., Durkin, K., & Pratt, C. (2003). Diﬀerences in assertive speech acts produced by children with autism,
Asperger syndrome, speciﬁc language impairment, and normal development. Development and Psychopathology,
15(1), 73–94.
